

Michael Psellos: Synopsis of Rhetoric

A translation based on the text of L.G. Westerink, *Michaelis Pselli Poemata* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1992), Poema 7. This translation replaces the much rougher version published in *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 31.1 (2001).

Psellos' synopsis of rhetoric was originally composed, probably, circa 1060-1067 for the young emperor-to-be Michael VII Doukas. It is an overview of the Hermogenic corpus (excluding the Hermogenic *Progymnasmata*) — *On Stases*, *On Invention* (four books), *On Types of Style* (two books), and *On the Method of Forcefulness* — which had been the basis for rhetorical training in the schools of Constantinople since late antiquity. The poem is composed in “political verse” (*politikoi stichoi*), a non-classical form of verse based on popular/vernacular poetry, which was increasingly used for addresses to the imperial family from the eleventh century on. “Political verse” (or, perhaps, “public verse”) consists of 15 syllables per line, with a caesura after the 8th syllable; stress-accent is mostly free, but with a major stress-accent on the penultimate syllable of each line; there is no rhyme. The line-numbers correspond to those of Westerink's text; the title of the Hermogenic books under discussion appear in the right-hand margin, at the point where they are taken up. All citations of the Hermogenic texts (in notes) refer to the edition of Rabe 1913.



Michael Psellos presents a poem to Michael Doukas:
from an illuminated manuscript at the Pantokrator Monastery, Mount Athos, 12th-13th century [Pantokrator 234, f. 254r.]
This is the only known portrait of Michael Psellos.

If you learn the art of rhetoric,¹ crownbearer,²
you'll be an able speaker,³ and you'll have a graceful tongue,
and you'll have the most persuasive epicheiremes.⁴

The art surveys political questions,⁵
and a political question, according to the technographer,⁶
is a doubtful matter that is arguable and divisible⁷ on both sides,
according to the customs and laws of cities,

On Stases

¹ *Hê technê tês rhêtōrikês: technê*, “art,” signifies either a body of techniques/principles for methodically accomplishing a goal (as in the “arts” of sculpture, music, navigation, engineering, politics, etc.), or — particularly in the case of rhetoric — a *handbook* that offers a systematic exposition of the art's principles (cf. Latin *ars*). In what follows I will generally render *technê* as “art.”

² *Stephêphorê*.

³ *Hexeis logou dunamin*: literally “you will have power of speech”; reading *dunamis* here as “power, capacity, ability, faculty.” Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2.1.

⁴ *Epicheirêma*: in rhetorical theory, an argumentative movement composed of linked sub-arguments and amplifications (compare the *sorites* in logic, composed of linked syllogisms). See note 65, below.

⁵ Literally, “it is a *theôros* of political *zêtêmata*.” *Theôros* seems to echo the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as “a faculty of observing (*dunamis tou theôrein*) in any given case the available means of persuasion” (*Rhetoric* 1.2.1); thus *theôros* can be understood here as “observer” in the sense of a “surveyor” of the rhetorical resources available for any given “question” (*zêtêma*). *Zêtêma* is a technical term in Hermogenes, signifying the political or civic “question” (or “inquiry”) with which the rhetor is concerned in a particular case.

⁶ *Ton technographon*, “the *technê*-writer”: i.e., Hermogenes.

⁷ *Merikê*: “divisible” into parts, i.e. the particular “headings” of invention prescribed for different *stases*.

concerning the just, the good, and the advantageous.

Indeed the kinds [*eidê*] of rhetoric are just these three —
judicial [*dikanikon*], advisory [*sumboulê*], and panegyric [*panêguris*] — 10
for the end of judicial rhetoric is the just,
of panegyric the good, and of advisory the advantageous.⁸

A disputable question, my lord,⁹ is given
no limit by the art (for that is a matter of law);
but the art establishes the point in question at any time.¹⁰

Questions differ in their potential,
for they bear greater and lesser persons and actions [*prôsopa kai pragmata*].¹¹
Often they are inconclusive in either respect,
and then the power of the rhetor is revealed,¹²
when he takes up a case that is weak in either way 20
and by the power of reasoning strengthens it and prevails.¹³

There are also many ill-formed problems,
which are ill-balanced or even prejudiced in nature;¹⁴
and there are, moreover, those that are by nature wholly invalid [*asustata*],
as they are one-sided or ultimately insoluble.¹⁵
Questions are valid,¹⁶ are brought to trial, and are declaimed on
when they involve both a person and an action that admits of judgment,
and that gives rise to persuasive arguments on either side.

Altogether, lord, there are thirteen
stases [*staseis*], as they are called, from the disputation [*to stasiazein*] 30
of rhetors using persuasive epicheiremes.¹⁷

The first of these is conjecture [*stochasmos*]: this is, master,¹⁸
an examination that establishes what is the case from a clear sign,
or from particular suspicions about a person.¹⁹

⁸ These are, of course, the standard three genres of classical rhetoric. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* calls them *dikanikon* ("judicial" discourse); *sumbouleutikon* or *dêmêgorikon* ("advisory" or "public" discourse, i.e., on questions of policy or action); and *epideiktikon* ("display"); later rhetorical handbooks tend to prefer the term *panêgurikon* to *epideiktikon*. Modern English translations of these terms (reflecting Latin influence) frequently render them as forensic, deliberative, and epideictic; I have tried to stay closer to the original sense of the Greek, and to Byzantine usage.

⁹ *Despota mou*.

¹⁰ *Zêtoumenon*: i.e., "what is inquired into." The point here is that the art of rhetoric itself prescribes no predetermined end (or outcome) to the process of disputation, but it identifies the precise point in dispute, the *stasis*, and supplies a series of positions for the arguers on opposing sides; the process of disputation can in principle go on indefinitely, but in a trial the ending is set by trial procedure.

¹¹ *Prôsopa* and *pragmata* are technical terms in Hermogenes' *On Stases*, denoting the "persons" (historical figures such as "Demosthenes," stock characters such as "rich man," etc.) and the "actions" (or "facts") laid down in the set problems for declamation exercises.

¹² I am rendering *rhêtôr* "untranslated" as rhetor, since it can mean either "orator" (or "speaker" or "writer") or "rhetorician" (a teacher of rhetoric).

¹³ I.e., the given facts in a well-formed declamation problem (persons, actions, circumstances) are normally insufficient in themselves to determine the outcome of the case, so that success will depend on the inventional and argumentational powers of the rhetor. A very similar notion is expressed by an anonymous scholar preserved in mss. from the 10th century and later: rhetorical training consists, he says, of "disputable and evenly balanced problems for the reason that whenever one side of the case is argued with greater strength, the power of the speaker is revealed, and not of the problem itself, which furnishes either side of the case with equal strength" (Walz 1832-36 7.1.49). This idea is not found in Hermogenes, though one might argue that it is implicit.

¹⁴ Hermogenes recognizes three kinds of faulty (yet arguable) declamation problems: the "ill-balanced" (*heterorrepês*) the "ill-formed" (*kakoplasta*; e.g., proposing a historical scenario that is contrary to fact), and the "prejudiced" (*proeilêmennê*; see Hermogenes *On Stases* 33.17-34.15). Psellos, however, seems to consider the ill-balanced and the prejudiced as types of the ill-formed.

¹⁵ *Asustata*: literally "without cohesion, indeterminate, unformed"; Hermogenes deploys this term to mean "invalid" declamation problems that are not capable of producing a determinate issue, and thus are of no use for declamation exercises. Hermogenes identifies seven types of *asustata* (*On Stases* 1.32.10-1.33.16), of which Psellos mentions two. (The "one-sided" differs from the "ill-balanced" and "prejudiced," above, as it has no arguments at all on one side.) In the next three lines Psellos paraphrases Hermogenes' criteria for distinguishing coherent or "valid" problems (1.31.19-1.32.9). It is worth noting that he is here moving through the Hermogenic material in backwards order.

¹⁶ *Sunestêke*, "coherent," i.e., forming a coherent or determinate issue to be argued.

¹⁷ Introducing a review of Hermogenes' synopsis-chapter (*On Stases* 2). This etymology from *to stasiazein* is not Hermogenic.

¹⁸ *Anax*.

The second is definition [*horos*], as it is called:
an examination of a favorable name for an action.²⁰

The third is practical deliberation [*pragmatikê*]: it investigates what should be done,
from which it receives its name, crownbearer.²¹

The fourth is counterplea [*antilêpsis*], on grounds of nonliability,
when a forceful accusation demands accountability for some act.²² 40

The fifth, in turn, is counterstance [*antistasis*]: here the defendant
grants the charge that has been brought against him,
and sets against it some good outcome from the very thing that he has done.

If [sixth] someone admits to having committed murder,
he shows that the victim himself deserved it:
he frames a countercharge [*antenklêma*], and countercharges justly.

If [seventh] he can aptly place the blame on someone else
(if something is to be punished), it is a shift of issue [*metastasis*];
but [eighth] if he is without defense, the issue is forgiveness [*sungnômê*].

If [ninth] a punishable act is connected with law,²³ 50
and one side puts forth the letter of the law
while the other sagely takes the law by its intentions,
the issue is letter and intent [*rhêton kai dianoia*].

If [tenth] some act resists assimilation to the letter of the law,
then one works up a rhetorical syllogism [*sullogismon rhêtorikon*]:
this is a comparison of the uncodified [*agraphou*] to the codified [*engraphon*].²⁴

If [eleventh] there is a controversy involving two or more laws
and it is a question of selecting not many but one of them,
naturally the issue is conflict of law [*antinomia*].

But [twelfth] ambiguity [*amphibolia*] is an issue that proceeds 60
from the prosody of accent or the parsing of words.²⁵

If [thirteenth] there is controversy whether any judgment should be made,²⁶
the issue is objection [*metalêpsis*], which you divide as follows,
for codified and uncodified kinds of this occur:
call the codified kind [*to engraphon*] a complete legal exclusion,
possessing the strength and power of argument from law;
and call the uncodified kind [*to agraphon*] nonlegal, for it does not cite law,

¹⁹ This line (34) is an exact quote from Hermogenes (*On Stases* 2.36.11-12; Rabe treats it as an interpolation); it seems to suggest the headings of “motive and capacity” in developing arguments about the likelihood that a person committed an alleged act. What Psellos makes less than clear is that “conjecture” involves questions of fact, and inquiry into the kinds of proof by which claims about fact can be substantiated – an *elenchos oustiopoios*, a process of “examination establishing what is.”

²⁰ E.g., if it is established that someone killed someone (the question of fact), one may dispute whether the killing was murder, justifiable homicide, an accident, etc. (the question of definition). Psellos (like Hermogenes) is thinking of the defendant, who will seek to put a “favorable name” on the act he is charged with.

²¹ I.e., the name of this stasis, *pragmatikê*, derives from *to prakteon*, “what should be done” — cf. *pragma*, “action, business” (the main concern of political deliberation).

²² I.e., “counterplea” arises when a defendant admits to an action but denies that it was wrong, or that he has any legal liability. This is the first of a set of stases (4-8) discussed by Hermogenes under the general heading of “judicial discourse” (*dikaialogia*), all of which arise from the position taken by the defendant.

²³ Psellos here transitions to the “legal” stases (9-12), which are concerned with the interpretation of laws.

²⁴ This stasis, called *sullogismos* by Hermogenes, deals with extension of a law to novel situations that it was not originally written for (or that it does not directly mention), by “inference” (*sullogismos*) from certain features of the act in question to analogous acts explicitly covered by the law (see Hermogenes *On Stases* 2.40.15-20; and Heath 1995 34, who renders this stasis as “assimilation”). Psellos’ rendition of *sullogismos* as *sullogismos rhêtorikos*, “rhetorical syllogism,” may be an echo of Aristotle’s definition of the enthymeme (*Rhetoric* 1.2.8).

²⁵ Psellos has in mind ambiguities in the meanings of written laws, arising from differences in meaning determined by pitch-accent (in words otherwise spelled or pronounced the same), or from different possible ways of parsing a word or phrase.

²⁶ This thirteenth stasis constitutes a fourth main type of position, alongside conjecture (*stochasmos*), definition (*horos*), and quality (*poiôtês*, with its “rational” and “legal” subdivisions); it has to do, in essence, with whether the matter in question can reasonably be brought to trial at all or should simply be dismissed (or, perhaps, transferred to a different venue).

but is more rational.²⁷ In fact two stases, practical deliberation and objection, as the art says,²⁸ in a certain way lie between the rational stases and the legal ones, not as unified wholes, but as composed of elements from both.²⁹ 70

Each of the abovementioned stases is called by both special [*idikon*] and generic [*genikon*] names: each is split up into both special and common [*koinon*] heads, in a certain way, of which some belong particularly [*idiôs*] to the prosecution, and some to the defense, while the common topics [*ta koina*] belong to both.

Again, according to another division, the subject-matter of the issues is in a certain way divided into types [*eidê*], since a speech has genre, and it is minutely subdivided, with no gap permitted.³⁰

That is the theory [*logos*] of issues, lord. 80
Next you should be told as well about proëmia, and the invention of the rest of the speech, and figures.³¹ *On Invention 1*

A speech composed with art, master, has both body and soul, both head and feet: the thought [*dianoia*] is its soul, the style [*lexis*] is its body, the introductory matter [*ta prooimia*] is its head, and the epilogue is its feet.

Indeed there are many topics of proëmia, but Hermogenes writes in his treatise of just four kinds.

[First, the topic] from prejudgments [*hupolêpsis*] of persons and actions: one should, with respect to prejudgments of the matter in hand, compose proëmia that give thanks or express regret.³² 90

[Second,] from division [*diairesis*]:³³ this is such, master, that when two crimes have been committed, and each of them is to be judged and punished, we divide and compose a proëmium such as this: if this person is to be punished even for one of these crimes, how much should he be chastised on account of both? And likewise for the second and third types, master, of this topic of the proëmium:

²⁷ The distinction here is between “objection” founded on the charge of *paragraphê* (“outside/against what is written”) — an argument that the case falls outside of written law, or that the charge itself or the procedure is illegal — and “objection” founded on appeals to principles not explicitly encoded in written law, such as notions of appropriate venue, or whether there is a *prima facie* basis for a trial (or a debate). This distinction further corresponds to the division (in Hermogenes) between the “rational” and “legal” subdivisions of the “qualitative” stases — the “rational” stases (3-8) involving the qualitative judgment of an act (in terms of considerations of justice, moral defensibility, mitigating circumstances, etc.), and the “legal” stases (9-12) involving the interpretation of written laws.

²⁸ *Technê*, meaning the rhetorical treatise; however, the remark that follows does not explicitly appear in the Hermogenic text (as we now have it), though it is inferable from it (see the following note).

²⁹ That is, they may draw on both “rational” and “legal” topics. As Heath’s (1995) analysis of Hermogenes’ *On Stases* shows, Hermogenes treats the different stases as drawing on overlapping sets of “heads” and topics. Psellos seems here to be recognizing that point, if only glancingly.

³⁰ This short, highly general segment on the subdivision of each stasis into headings and topics (ll. 72-79) represents the latter two thirds of Hermogenes’ *On Stases* (chapters 3-12), in which the “division” and handling of each stasis is discussed in detail; Psellos has explicitly “covered” only Hermogenes’ introductory discussion (chapters 1-2). Psellos’ mention of an “other division” (*allon merismon*) appears to invoke the Aristotelian notion of *idia* and *koina* from the *Rhetoric*, especially Aristotle’s treatment of the *idia* belonging to the symbouleutic, epideictic, and dikanic genres in Book 1 — though this account does not really square well with the treatment of topics in Hermogenean stasis-theory.

³¹ Psellos here begins his overview of the four books of the Hermogenic treatise *On Invention (Peri Heuresêôn)*; Book 1 is concerned primarily with the “invention” of proëmia; the other books are concerned with “the rest of the speech, and figures.”

³² The topic of *hupolêpsis*, “prejudgments,” involves opening with a *response* to existing attitudes toward “the matter in hand” (*tôn apêrithmêmenôn*, “things that have been reckoned up”), or in other words the givens of the case: insofar as they can be regarded as good or bad, the speaker can open with expressions of thanks or grieving. See “Hermogenes” *On Invention* 1.1. 93-100. Kennedy 2005 5 renders *hupolêpsis* as “supposition”; Patillon 1997 209 as *préjugé*.

³³ In “Hermogenes” *On Invention* 1.2 .101-103 this topic appears as *hupodiaireseôs*, “subdivision,” of which “Hermogenes” recognizes the three types mentioned here. Kennedy 2005 17 renders this topic as “subordination.” The idea is to amplify the seriousness of the matter in question by invoking “subdivisions” or subsidiary considerations.

division from prejudice [*hupolepsis*], and from considerations of time.³⁴ 100

Again, the art establishes a third topic of proëmia, which it designates as “from abundance” [*periousia*],³⁵ as when accusing someone of murder I add that I could accuse him of sacrilege as well — a greater and worse crime than the first.

The fourth topic of proëmia is from the occasion [*kairos*], as when one claims in public proceedings that what is sought has come to pass already in events that have transpired.³⁶

A whole proëmium consists of these four parts: opening [*protasis*], elaboration [*kataskeuê*], proposition [*axiôsis*], and finally the closing [*basis*], which completes the proëmium.³⁷ 110

A proëmium is adequately amplified by doubling a word, or doubling a clause.

The four parts may be illustrated with an example, thus:³⁸ “What memorial of martyrs would be satisfactory, for one who loves martyrs?” This is the opening [*protasis*] of the speech. Next observe the other parts: “For the honoring of martyrdom is an act of goodwill to the Lord.”³⁹ This clearly is an elaboration [*kataskeuê*] of the opening. “With speech, therefore, honor him who has been martyred.”⁴⁰ This clearly is the proposition [*axiôsis*]. Next see the closing [*basis*]: 120 “... so that you yourself would willingly become a martyr.”⁴¹

It is called a closing, since it is a final part in which the whole premium seems to come to rest,⁴² and also an elaboration [*kataskeuê*] of the proposition [*axiôsis*], which we do to venture an additional remark [*epiphônêma*] as we embark — concerning which, I shall teach you the progression of the speech.⁴³

And that is a brief art of proëmia for you. **On Invention 2**
When you are going to bring your speech to the narration [*diêgesis*], look for a preliminary statement [*prokatasstasis*] before you take it up:⁴⁴

³⁴ All three types of “division” involve cases with multiple misdeeds; the second involves repeat malefactors whose known bad past can be discussed, and the third looks to “time” as it involves repeat malefactors who should be dealt with “once and for all,” so that their crimes will no longer be repeated.

³⁵ *On Invention* 1.3.104. Patillon 1997 218 renders this topic as “*a fortiori*”; Kennedy 2005 23 as “superfluity.” The idea is that the speaker *could* indict the accused for an even greater crime than he actually is charged with.

³⁶ *On Invention* 1.4.105.

³⁷ *On Invention* 1.5.106-108. The terms given by “Hermogenes” are *protasis*, *kataskeuê*, *apodosis* “which is an *axiôsis*,” and *basis*. *Axiôsis* seems to signify an evaluative statement, or an announcement of the speaker’s central claim. “Hermogenes” says that the “more political” (as opposed to “panegyric”) kind of proëmium may consist of a “plain *axiôsis*,” i.e. a simple announcement of the proposition the speaker intends to argue for (106-107). *Kataskeuê*, which (as a rhetorical term) usually signifies “confirmation” or “proof,” here seems to signify any sort of supporting statement, development, or elaboration. See Kennedy 2005 9 n. 9, 27 n. 40 and 44.

³⁸ The example that follows is not, of course from “Hermogenes”: Psellos quotes from Basil the Great, Homily 19 (*On the Forty Martyrs*, PG 31, 508 B 1-4, 6-7), though not with complete accuracy (see below).

³⁹ Psellos compresses Basil’s statement, which in its full form is (roughly), “for the honor paid by fellow-servants to the good bears proof of our goodwill to our common Lord” (PG 31, 508 B2-4).

⁴⁰ Again, Psellos loosely paraphrases Basil’s language: “With sincerity call blessed him who has borne martyrdom” (PG 31, 508 B6-7).

⁴¹ Here Psellos actually expands Basil’s briefer phrase, “... so that you would voluntarily die [*phenêi*] a martyr” (PG 31, 508 B7), which is a continuation of the preceding line. The only locution in common to both Psellos’ and Basil’s versions is *têi proairesei*, “voluntarily” (“by choice”).

⁴² *Bainein eoike*, literally “seems to go,” with a notion of the proëmium coming to rest sententiously (with “panegyric” flourishes) in its *basis*. Cf. the perfective senses of *bainein* as “stand” (or “stand on a base”); and the senses of *basis* as a “step, measured movement, rhythmical close,” and also “base” or “pedestal.”

⁴³ According to “Hermogenes” (106-107), the *basis* takes on a panegyric or “epiphonematic” (*epiphônematikos*) function when it gives a reason for the proposition (*axiôsis*). An *epiphônêma*, in rhetoric, is a sententious “added remark” used to finish off a passage with a flourish. Psellos conceives this as a flourish performed as a speaker completes his proëmium and “embarks on” or “goes into” (*eisbebêkotes/eisbainô*) the body of the speech.

it is the preliminary part of a narrative, 130
 in essence a pre-narrative [*prodiêgêsis*] of things from beginning to end.⁴⁵
 It truly would be artless if, without preliminaries,
 you immediately began the narrative itself.
 The subject of immigration, for example, takes preliminaries;
 likewise the proposal and repeal of laws, indeed the majority
 of cases [*hupotheseis*], take preliminaries too.⁴⁶
 You should undertake a prelude to this sort of narrative;
 let it be the preliminary statement you compose.

When you have set forth the preliminary statement, state the narrative.⁴⁷
 It is, in style [*phrasis*], both ample and varied: 140
 it is not confined by set rules of speech,
 but is amplified with many clauses [*kôla*] and lines of thought [*dianoiai*].
 And if indeed you wish to recast it
 in different locutions, with varied words,
 embellish and interpose, first, what must be done,
 then the reason for it, then what has been left undone,
 and then the reason for that, in those four steps.⁴⁸

Know the three modes [*tropoi*] of narration, crownbearer:
 the simple [*haplous*], the argued [*enkataskeuos*], and the highly wrought [*endiaskeuos*].⁴⁹
 When the facts are many and complex, 150
 and have inherent strengths and subtleties on both sides,⁵⁰
 narrate, lord, not argumentatively but simply.
 There is an example of this in Demosthenes:
 “We went out to Panactus two years ago,
 and the sons of Ariston were billeted with us;
 soon they were abusive in full view of everyone,
 and they were violent and struck [us] and broke the chamberpots.”⁵¹

⁴⁴ I.e., *zêtei*, “seek,” inquire after or invent, a *prokatastasis* when you would “take up” the narrative (*diêgesis*). “Hermogenes” defines *prokatastasis* as a “*prodiêgesis*,” that is, a “pre-narrative” before the narrative proper; the chapter-title given in the manuscripts (perhaps a later addition) also refers to the *diêgesis* as a *katastasis*, a “setting down” of the given facts a particular case is about (108-109); see Kennedy 2005 35 n. 55. Psellos now turns to the second book of *On Invention*, which is concerned primarily with the handling of the narrative (2.1).

⁴⁵ “Things from beginning to end,” *ta ap’ arches achri telou*, is a standard topic of invention for narration (i.e., “the sequence of events”). The *prokatastasis* is a brief preliminary overview of the matters to be related in more detail by the narrative proper.

⁴⁶ A rapid gesture toward the following two chapters of *On Invention* — 2.2, “On immigration, and invention in these matters”; and 2.3, “On introduction of laws” — and possibly (and more generally) the next several chapters as well, which take up war and peace (2.4), impiety and murder (2.5), and crimes against the state (2.6). The term *hupothesis* was a technical term for a specific “case” (as in a declamation exercise), as opposed to a *thesis* or “general proposition” for philosophical debate.

⁴⁷ Psellos here turns to the subject-matter of *On Invention* 2.7, “On narration.”

⁴⁸ “Reason” here is *aitia* (cause), not justification. Psellos only partially reflects (and seems more rigid than) the procedure suggested in *On Invention* 2.7.120-122. “Hermogenes” recommends that every statement in the narrative be “extended” to three or four clauses that reiterate and embellish the idea — and that the narrative ideally should state “what has been done,” the reason (*aitia*) for it, “what has not been done,” the reason for that, and also rational “calculations” (*logismoi*, e.g., “if this were the case, then ...”). Psellos’ notion of “interposing” these things reflects “Hermogenes’” illustration, which discusses [1] thing not done + reason; [2] thing done + reason; [3] thing not done again + reason; etc. — all treated “in many and varied clauses.”

⁴⁹ Kennedy 2005 55 renders *enkataskeuos* as “argued,” and Patillon 1997 232 as “with confirmation” (*avec confirmation*), in line with the common rhetorical use of the term *kataskeuê* to mean “confirmation” of a proposition. Here the *enkataskeuos* mode of narration is linked with the statement of a “reason” in the sense of a cause (*aitia*) of a given fact; as a statement of the reason why something happened, it is more an elaboration or explanation than a proof.

⁵⁰ “Hermogenes” speaks here of “many and varied” facts that “weigh against the opponent and help our case” (2.7.122; Kennedy 1995 55); Psellos seems to be thinking still of evenly-balanced declamation problems.

⁵¹ The example here, as in *On Invention* 2.7.123, is drawn from Demosthenes’ *Against Conon* (34), in which Demosthenes says he will narrate the facts as briefly as possible; but the situation represented here by Psellos only vaguely resembles that of Demosthenes’ narrative (or “Hermogenes’” version of it). Demosthenes and his friends suffered affronts from the sons of Conon, and Ariston is only briefly mentioned later in the speech; likewise, Conon’s sons abused first the slaves of Demosthenes and his companions — beating them, emptying chamber-pots on them, and urinating on them — and then they assaulted Demosthenes and his companions themselves. Psellos appears to be quoting from (vague) memory to a student who has not actually read Demosthenes’ speech, or he is misquoting “Hermogenes” — who, for that matter, does not quote

But if the narrative in brief is very forceful,
 narrate it with argument [*enkataskeuôis*], expanding it with reasons [*aitia*];⁵²
 and if it is both brief and also very clear, 160
 elaborate it boldly, in highly wrought ways [*endiaskeuoi tropoi*].
 And what is highly wrought? An ornate style [*poikillomenos tropos*].
 And here a poetic example should be given you:
 “First they drew back [the sacrificial victim’s head], cut the throat and flayed the skin,
 then butchered out the thighs and covered them with savory fat,
 and carefully roasted them and drew them off [the fire].”⁵³
 A second example should be given to you too,
 an extremely clever one from the *Funeral Oration* of the Theologian:⁵⁴
 “They lunge and shout, they send a cloud of dust on high,⁵⁵
 they sit and hold the reins, they lash the air, 170
 they yoke and immediately re-yoke [their horses] in some way.”
 And when the master of sophistomania⁵⁶ says “on high,”
 then adds the cause — that they are many and young⁵⁷ —
 he has briefly given you an argued exposition [*ekthesis enkataskeuos*].

The preconfirmation [*prokataskeuê*] (for this must be mentioned to you too) **On Invention 3**
 is called the preliminary part of confirmation [*presbuteron kataskeuês*];⁵⁸
 and this also should be taught to you with examples,
 not from the Demosthenic writings, but from those of the Theologian.
 For this masterful philosopher and rhetor,⁵⁹

when impelled to confirm [*kataskeuazein*] God’s sovereignty, 180
 set forth all three heads of his argument:
 “There are,” he said, “three ancient doctrines concerning God:
 anarchy, polyarchy, and finally monarchy.”⁶⁰
 The presentation of these three headings, then,
 is a preconfirmation artistically set forth.

There is, too, a kind of rebuttal [*lusion*] called “forcible” [*biaion*],⁶¹
 when we take up our opponents’ strongest argument
 and turn it against them, as though demonstrated by themselves,

Demosthenes accurately either. (“Hermogenes” has the sons of Conon urinating on Demosthenes and his friends and breaking chamber-pots over their heads.)

⁵² I.e., when the facts comprising the narrative are brief and forceful (favorable for one’s case), the speaker may elaborate “argumentatively” with discussions of “reasons” (*aitiai*, causes) for what happened.

⁵³ Homer, *Iliad* 1.459-460, 466; 2.422-423, 429; and elsewhere (this is a formula). This example — an approximate quote in political verse, not Homer’s hexameters — apparently is “highly wrought” because of its use (in Greek) of archaic poetic diction and a higher than usual density of schematic figures (most notably asyndeton, homoioteleuton, pariosis, and paromoiosis, not to mention poetic meter). Neither this nor the following example are taken from “Hermogenes” *On Invention*.

⁵⁴ Gregory Nazianzos, Oration 43.15 (*Funeral Oration for Basil the Great*; PG 36, 516 A 2-5). Psellos’ “quotation” of Gregory here is adapted to the requirements of political verse, and is not very exact.

⁵⁵ *Anô*. Gregory actually says *ouranôî*, “to heaven.”

⁵⁶ *Ho pansophos tèn sophistomanian*, more literally “the man all-wise at sophistomania.”

⁵⁷ *Plêthos kai neoi*, loosely paraphrasing Gregory’s additional remark, *oudenos ontes kurioi*, “none of them being a *kurios*” (i.e., the head of a household).

⁵⁸ Psellos is now moving to the subject-matter of *On Invention* 3, which deals with methods of *kataskeuê*, “confirmation/proof” of one’s case; *prokataskeuê*, “preconfirmation,” is the subject-matter of 3.2. Preconfirmation, like the “preliminary statement” (*prokatasistasis*) of a narrative, is in essence what modern handbooks call a “forecast” statement of what is to come in a particular section of a discourse.

⁵⁹ *Outos kai gar ho pansophos philosophos kai rhêtôr*.

⁶⁰ Gregory Nazianzos, Oration 29.2 (*On the Son*; PG 36, 76 A 6-7).

⁶¹ *On Invention* 3.3: this chapter appears fifth in Rabe 1913’s rearrangement of the chapters of book 3 (though Rabe retains the original numbering); Psellos follows the “disordered” order of the manuscripts. It seems odd, to move directly to “rebuttal” from “preconfirmation” without taking up “confirmation” itself; and modern translations (Patillon 1997, Kennedy 2005) follow Rabe’s reorganization. However, since the Hermogenic *On Stases* generally treats the actual arguments in a case as arising from the *denial* of an accusation, and generally organizes its stasis-system around the positions of *defense*, it may in fact be logical to think of the “confirmation” (or “proof”) of a case as starting from *lusion*, “rebuttal” (or, more literally, “release, loosening, undoing” of the charge). It is also possible that Psellos is taking *lusion* in the more general sense of a “solution” to a problem (i.e., “loosening” or “untying” a knot).

as Chrysostom did in his *Philogonius*.⁶²

When he was introducing his argument on the mysteries
he barred the unrepentant from coming to communion,
as some maintained that they would not
submit to communion every day, but only once a year.
The masterful teacher, he of the tongue called golden⁶³
forcefully replied, “this itself is a grievous error,
since you neither purify yourself nor make progress toward complete purification
when you partake of the holy mysteries just one time.”

In a speech, the heading [*kephalaion*] of the case [*hypothesis*]
is introduced either by us or our opponents,
the latter of which requires a wholly artistic and embellished rebuttal.⁶⁴
It is introduced artistically in “four-wheeled” fashion,
with the proposition [*protasis*] and support [*hupophora*], a counterproposition [*antiprotasis*],
and an oppositional rebuttal from the counterproposition.
The proposition introduces the support,
and the support is the opponent’s argument,
while the counterproposition is a promise of rebuttal,
after which the rebuttal arises from epicheiremes.

The epicheireme confirms [*kataskueazei*] the rebuttal,
and elaboration [*ergasia*] is a function [*dunamis*] of epicheiremes,
just as the enthymeme is, in turn, [a function] of elaboration,
and the epenthymemes of proenthymemes.⁶⁵

The power [*dunamis*] of epicheiremes is obtained
from topics [*topoi*] — person, time, manner and cause —
but primarily from the facts themselves, for in them lies the material of the case.⁶⁶
The elaboration [*ergasia*] bundles the preliminary arguments [*proepicheirêseis*]
and is fortified with illustration [*parabolê*] and examples [*paradeigmata*],
and comparisons of lessers, greaters, equals, and opposites.

The natural form of enthymemes is drawn
from every circumstance by means of comparisons;
the enthymeme is a twofold enthymeme.⁶⁷

You must use objections [*enstaseis*] and counter-rejoinders [*antiparastaseis*]
in all cases,⁶⁸ for they are serviceable in their way,

⁶² In what follows Psellos “quotes” very loosely from John Chrysostom’s *On the Blessed Philogonius* (PG 48, 755.21-23). For an English translation of the passage, see Harkins 1982 180-181 (Homily 6.35).

⁶³ I.e., Chrysostom (*Chrusostomos*), “Goldenmouth.”

⁶⁴ *On Invention* 3.4. Here Psellos (with “Hermogenes”) continues the theme of refutative (or defensive) strategies as the starting-points of “confirmation”; what follows is a technique for developing “headings” of argument introduced by the opponent.

⁶⁵ Psellos is jumping around in the Hermogenic chapters on epicheiremes, enthymemes, and *ergasia* (*On Invention* 3.5-9). “Hermogenes,” having taught that *lusis* is “confirmed” by epicheiremes, says that *ergasia* “confirms” (or “elaborates,” *kataskueazei*) the epicheireme, and that the enthymeme “confirms” (*kataskueazei* again) the *ergasia* (3.8.151). The epicheireme, in the loosest sense an “argument,” is commonly conceived in rhetorical treatises as a five-step movement consisting of “a proposition, supporting reason, proof of the reason, embellishment, and conclusion” (Kennedy 2005 85). An enthymeme is a stylistically pointed summing-up of a claim and its proof, often functioning as a “cap” to a passage of discussion (such as an *ergasia* consisting of examples, or, even, a bundle of subordinate enthymemes), and is often stated in antithetical form (see below); thus the supporting-reason-plus-proof part of an epicheireme can be understood as an enthymeme in itself, and an *ergasia* can be understood to be summed up, “confirmed” or *completed* by an enthymeme also, so that the epicheireme can be understood as being composed of enthymematic parts. An “epenthymeme” is an additional enthymeme added as a supplement (or embellishment) to a preceding (“pro”) enthymeme (3.9.152).

⁶⁶ *Hulê*, “wood,” or raw material, i.e., to be carved or worked upon (*On Invention* 3.5.140-147). Psellos seems to differ from “Hermogenes,” who seems to have in mind something like the Aristotelian notion of “material cause.”

⁶⁷ This somewhat cryptic remark reflects a long tradition in the handbooks of understanding the enthymeme as constructed from “oppositions” and as typically stated in doublets (usually antithetical). “Hermogenes” says the enthymeme takes a “comparative form” (*schêma sunkriton*; *On Invention* 3.8.152). Psellos may be conflating the Aristotelian account of the enthymeme as a “rhetorical syllogism” with this tradition: thus “the enthymeme” (as defined by Aristotle) typically occurs (*tunchanei*) as a “twofold enthymeme” (as defined by the handbooks).

but the objection is more confrontational,⁶⁹
and introduces denial [*anairesis*] and rebuttal [*lusion*] of the act in question,
while the counter-rejoinder is more subtle.

Thus, if someone should say, “There was no need for you to kill him,”
he has taken up a counterstance [*antistasis*] that rejects the act;⁷⁰
but if someone says, “It may have been necessary, but not in such a manner,”
he has spoken a counter-rejoinder, a more moderate rebuttal.

But whatever should be brought in first to questions in dispute, 230
it is not making some proclamation; you should deliberate with reason.
Counter-rejoinder smoothes the way.⁷¹

The so-called “from a beginning until its end”
is the most essential heading of them all,⁷²
and it is elaborated [*kataskewazetai*] in different ways —
not with circumstantial details [*peristaseis*], but with various partitions [*tomai*],
with extended breathings [*pneumata*], and with tightly-woven periods [*periodoi*].⁷³
Each subdivision [*hupodiairesis*] accomplishes a characterization [*prosôpopoiia*],
and finishes artistically with a supposition [*plaston*].⁷⁴
In a practical deliberation, this so-called heading 240
of “from a beginning until its end” is difficult to refute;
use the headings of objection [*metalêpsis*] mainly.⁷⁵

The arrangement [*taxis*] of epicheiremes, lord,
is of two kinds: demonstrative [*apodeiktikê*] and panegyric [*panêgurikôtera*].⁷⁶
The former is judicial [*dikanikê*], and requires
an especially contestatory style of civic discourse;
the latter is altogether beautiful and brilliant, and colors the discourse.
If, then, a speech includes both kinds of arrangement,
save the more brilliant kind for last.

“Definition, counterdefinition, ratiocination [*sullogismos*] and rebuttal [*lusion*] 250
are four names, but with two functions,”⁷⁷
for ratiocination and definition rule over these,

⁶⁸ *On Invention* 3.6.136-138. The “objection” or *enstasis* is in essence a denial of some proposition, thereby putting it “in stasis” (in dispute); the “counter-rejoinder” or *antiparastasis* answers the opponent’s counterstatement to the *enstasis*, at which point the issue becomes more precise.

⁶⁹ *Turannikôteron*, literally “more tyrannical,” or (in Byzantine usage) “more rebellious” (Sophocles 1887 1100).

⁷⁰ This is, apparently, *antistasis* functioning as an *enstasis*, “objecting” to a claim that the defendant had acted in self-defense.

⁷¹ The interesting points here — which seem to be Psellos’ additions — are that *antiparastasis* is preferable to flat *enstasis*, and that one does not begin a process of argumentation by flatfootedly declaring one’s thesis (the sort of thing commonly recommended in modern textbooks). Rather, one first engages with an opponent’s position, establishing the precise issue to be resolved through *antiparastasis*, and then unfolding a *lusion* by means of epicheiremes, each elaborated with *ergasia* and enthymemes.

⁷² *Ap’ archês mechris autou tou telous*; *On Invention* 3.10.154-158. “Hermogenes” calls it *ap’ archês achri telous*, “from beginning to end.” Psellos’ version of the name suggests that this topic has to do with a sequence of events treated as an entelechial unfolding from an originating event [*archê*] to its logical or necessary outcome [*autou telos*]. It has relevance for practical deliberation, which tries to project the probable results of a proposed action, as well as for any discourse, including the narration of a judicial discourse, or history, where one would need to narrate a rationally coherent sequence of events and represent characters, very much in the manner of an Aristotelian plot; thus a discussion of style and *prosôpopoiia* comes into play.

⁷³ I.e., one does not elaborate this heading by adding more circumstantial details, but by breaking it into numerous small parts (*tomê*, a “cutting”), which can be done (says “Hermogenes”) with various figures, and by using complex sentence-structures. In rhetorical terms, a “breathing” (*pneuma*) is a unit of oratorical prose rhythm — a phrase, clause, or more complex structure delivered within a single breath. Composition by *pneuma* lends itself to a paratactic, “additive” style. A *periodos* is, of course, a “periodic” (hypotactic/cumulative as opposed to paratactic/additive) sentence. Both *pneuma* and *periodos* are discussed as “figures” in *On Invention* 4.3, 4.4.

⁷⁴ A *plaston* is a “suppositious” or fictive epicheireme added at the end of a “beginning-to-end” sequence, as a striking way of rounding out the facts (*On Invention* 3.11.158-161). “Hermogenes” does not suggest, as Psellos seems to, that a *plaston* should be added to every subdivision. Psellos seems to be thinking of the uses of “beginning-to-end” in history-writing or poetry, and of the “cuttings” as scenes with characters making speeches.

⁷⁵ *On Invention* 3.12.161-162. “Objection,” *metalêpsis*, is not a topic of invention but the general stasis of arguing for dismissal or transference of a proceeding; it functions as a means of “refuting” an otherwise unrefutable story as irrelevant or inadmissible.

⁷⁶ *On Invention* 3.13.

⁷⁷ *On Invention* 3.14. This is a quotation of the opening sentence of the chapter (3.14.164), slightly rearranged to fit the meter of “political verse.”

since counterdefinition and rebuttal derive from ratiocination.
 In the midst of the action set forth by the discourse,
 the ratiocination itself, which is the rebuttal,
 follows the action and comes after it,
 when definition and counterdefinition have come first.⁷⁸

Learn, as well, the embellishment [*diaskeuê*] of the problem,⁷⁹
 for vivid representation [*diatupôsis*] of the action is subtle,
 as I said before concerning narrative. 260

Here the rhetor must aim at probability.
 Even if embellishment is possible twice, or often,
 it should not be used indiscriminately, but should be managed economically,
 so that you won't be thought vulgar for using it all the time.
 But if you wish to bring it into a speech at a certain point,
 you can derive a pretext for discussion from a single word:
 for example, if you say "find me so great a number,"
 it is available to your argument, lord, from history.⁸⁰

The first figure of speech [*schema logou*] is opposition [*antitheton*],
 which provides you with a twofold line of thought:⁸¹ 270
 from a question of fact in its natural form
 it takes the opposite thought to its completion.
 For example, "it is day, for if it were not day ...
 then it is day."⁸² That is the figure of opposition.

The period [*periodos*] is a key to epicheiremes,⁸³
 gathering both figures and thoughts in abundance,
 and from these the whole conception, artistically and accurately:
 many-figured forms make up a period.
 But the vocative in a breathing is not part of the period.⁸⁴
 [for example,] "O, you — what name could anyone properly call you by?"⁸⁵ 280
 He [Demosthenes] has not bundled it, but strung it out, so it's not a period.
 There are many types of periods, master.
 There is the monocolon, and the double too,
 and there's the tricolon as well, and the quadruple.⁸⁶

On Invention 4

⁷⁸ The somewhat murky point here seems to be that counterdefinition follows from definition, and rebuttal from ratiocination; that definition/counterdefinition (of the established facts, actions) necessarily precedes rebuttal/ratiocination; and that all of this requires a prior narration of the facts. "Hermogenes" suggests that definition and ratiocination, on one hand, can be confirmed by "the same epicheiremes," while, on the other, counterdefinition and rebuttal can likewise be confirmed by "the same epicheiremes" appropriate to them (3.14.164; Kennedy 2005 124-125).

⁷⁹ *On Invention* 3.15. The "problem" [*problêma*] is the set-problem for a declamation exercise. What Psellos and "Hermogenes" have in mind are quasi-digressive amplifications on particular points, chiefly in the form of narratives drawn from history (when they are relevant), and that "embellish" the bare facts with vivid, emotive, poetic, and/or exaggerated (but still credible) description. This was typically treated in ancient handbooks as a function of epilogues, though the epilogue proper is not treated (or even mentioned) by "Hermogenes" (Kennedy 2005 127).

⁸⁰ A very elliptical rendition of an example from "Hermogenes" (3.15.170), where discussion (in a declamation) of the sacrifice of 300 prisoners calls up a further discussion of the 300 Spartans who died at Thermopylae, which is then employed as a "commonplace" to embellish (*diaskeuê*) the vivid description (*diatupôsis*) of the sacrifice and to heighten the sense of outrage. The "single word" that provides the pretext is "300."

⁸¹ *On Invention* 4.1-2. Psellos now turns to the subject-matter of Book 4, which is concerned with figures of speech.

⁸² Again Psellos gives an elliptical rendition of "Hermogenes'" example. As "Hermogenes" gives it, it is: "Since it is day, that must be done. This is the action in question. And the opposite of this is, For if it was not day, but night, perhaps it should not be done; but since it is day, it is appropriate to do it." (4.2) As Kennedy notes (2005 141 n. 207), this is a standard example in ancient (especially Stoic) logic; Psellos apparently regards it as familiar enough to be merely mentioned in abbreviated form.

⁸³ *On Invention* 4.3.

⁸⁴ *On Invention* 4.4-5, on the "breathing" (*pneuma*) and the "extension" (*tasis*) of a *pneuma*, are both glancingly alluded to here, and discussed more fully below. *Pneuma*, as a rhetorical term, signifies the "figure" of a syntactic unit delivered in a single breath. Psellos is here echoing "Hermogenes'" language (at 4.3.171), though he seems to replace *meros pneumatatos*, "part of a breathing," with *topos periodos*, "topic of a period."

⁸⁵ Demosthenes 18.22 (*On The Crown*), as quoted (accurately) by "Hermogenes" (4.3.171).

⁸⁶ That is, periods composed of single, double, triple, and quadruple clauses.

A period can also take chiasmus,⁸⁷ or be inverted in some way.
The examples of all this are clear.⁸⁸

Take the overview from me, and then forthrightly ask your questions,
and I will tell you the solution of the problem:

then you will not wonder, lord, at the writer's art [*technê*],
if you have an abbreviated version of the whole.⁸⁹

290

There is also the figure of the oratorical breathing [*pneuma rhêtorikon*]:⁹⁰
it is a composition of speech completing a whole thought
in clauses [*kôla*] and phrases [*kommata*] smaller than clauses.⁹¹
The hexasyllabic or briefer phrase
is counted the same as a poetic measure [*epôidon metron*],
while anything above a trimeter up to a heroic verse
is considered a straight, extended clause.

There are two types of artistic breathings [*technika pneumata*]:⁹²
either you take one thought and variously ring the changes on it
in clauses and phrases; or you take many and varied thoughts
and elaborate each one in phrases and clauses.

300

Florescence of speech [*akmê logou*] (for you must learn this too) is
a quick change of figures within a breathing;
but there is also a florescence of thoughts [*akmê noêmatôn*],
when, having filled out a thought with an extended breathing,
you slip unnoticed into another, and thence another.⁹³

The dilemma [*dilêmmaton*] is a striking figure of speech:⁹⁴
when, having split a question into two alternatives,
each of which is a trap,⁹⁵ you ask your opponents to reply,
either you render them unable to speak,
or else they rashly speak and you defeat them.

310

Echo [*parêchêsis*] is the figure of similar words
that sound the same, lord, with different meanings,
as when Xenophon said, "He persuades [*peithei*] the Peithian."⁹⁶

The circle [*kuklos*] is rounded off, if someone puts
the same pronoun, or another part of speech, at the beginning and end [of a construction].⁹⁷

There are two types of additional remark [*epiphônêma*].⁹⁸
The first is a statement brought in from outside,
which you take up apart from the subject and set beside it,
and venture cautiously as additional commentary.

320

A brief, Homeric example should be mentioned:

⁸⁷ *Chiasmus* is the figure of "crossover" parallelism, e.g. "fair is foul and foul is fair"; the name derives from the Greek letter *chi* (X).

⁸⁸ I.e., in "Hermogenes."

⁸⁹ "The writer" (*ho graphôn*) is, presumably, Hermogenes.

⁹⁰ *On Invention* 4.4.183.

⁹¹ I.e., a "breathing" or *pneuma* is a non-periodic combination of clauses and phrases deliverable within a single breath.

⁹² *On Invention* 4.4.185.

⁹³ *On Invention* 4.4.189. *Akmê*, usually translated as "florescence" or "vigor" (as a stylistic term), literally means "zenith" or "culminating point"; "Hermogenes" seems to think of it, in *akmê* of speech, as a process of varying the figural constructions employed in the "extension" of a single idea in a single *pneuma* (i.e., ringing the changes on a single idea); and, in *akmê* of thought, as a process of building to a climactic statement by moving "unnoticed" from one idea to another, as one moves from one *pneuma* to another, while seeming to reiterate the same idea. The notion of an "extended *pneuma*" glancingly alludes to *On Invention* 4.5, on *tasis* (a "chapter" consisting of a single brief paragraph).

⁹⁴ *On Invention* 4.6. "Striking" here translates *drimus*, more literally "sharp, piercing, keen, shrewd."

⁹⁵ *Amphikrêmon*, literally "having cliffs all around," or in other words "hemmed in on all sides."

⁹⁶ *On Invention* 4.7. *Peithei ton Peithian* is a pun on "the Pythian" (*ton Puthian*), an epithet of Apollo. "Figure" in line 312 translates *kallos*, literally "beauty," which Psellos repeats from "Hermogenes," and which Kennedy 2005 173 renders as "ornament."

⁹⁷ *On Invention* 4.8.

⁹⁸ *On Invention* 4.9. As noted above, an *epiphônêma* is a sententious "added remark" used to finish off a passage with a flourish.

“And together with Euros, Notos roused and rushed headlong, and stormy Zephyr, and sky-born Boreas, and they covered with clouds the land and sea alike; and down from heaven rushed the night.”⁹⁹ This last item is an additional remark brought in from outside, alien yet legitimate (as you may wish to understand), venturing to derive the night from heaven.¹⁰⁰

Some recognize a second [type of] additional remark, when, having extended a breathing in varied clauses, one adds a clause that pulls everything together, as in Homer’s elegant description of Ajax, which recapitulates everything with a single clause: “One evil after another was hammered on.”¹⁰¹

330

A third [type of] additional remark is quite acceptable if you bring in metaphorical expressions¹⁰² from what has been said earlier and properly apply them to make comparisons.

A metaphor [*tropê*] is the use of a common word for both the presented fact and something else that is introduced.¹⁰³

Dignified language [*semnos logos*] beautifies a name with a name:¹⁰⁴ for if you call a prostitute a courtesan,¹⁰⁵ you transform her; you dignify what she is called by artfully translating it.

340

But if some wholly artless statement has not been properly prepared for, call it bad taste [*kakozêlon*] for what is fitting in a speech.¹⁰⁶

There is also a figured kind of problem [*problêma eschêmatismenon*], either by implication [*emphasis*], indirection [*plagion*], or opposition [*enantion*], and implication is more rhetorical by far.¹⁰⁷

Comparative problems [*problêmata sunkritika*] absolutely must be described for you. In conjecture [*stochasmos*], and in motive and capacity [*boulêsis kai dunamis*], it is easy: what the “I” and the “you” have ascribed to motive easily produce a comparison for you, crownbearer.¹⁰⁸

350

And that is the end of the *Invention* for you.

⁹⁹ *Odyssey* 5.295-296 (Psellos’ ll. 322-323), and 293-294 (ll. 324-325); describing the East, South, West, and North winds respectively, when stirred up by Poseidon. Psellos modifies Homer’s lines to fit the meter of political verse — and follows “Hermogenes” in “quoting” them out of order for the sake of illustrating *epiphônêma*.

¹⁰⁰ “Alien” (*allotrios*) because “night” is not properly part of a description of the winds; “legitimate” (*gnêsios*) as a supplement because it, like them, is part of a description of the darkening sky. Kennedy 2005 175 n. 256 considers this example in “Hermogenes” to be unilluminating; Psellos likewise seems to be struggling to explain it.

¹⁰¹ *Iliad* 16.111.

¹⁰² *Ta tôn tropôn onomata*, more literally “tropological expressions”; “Hermogenes” seems to be thinking of “tropes” primarily as metaphors (see below).

¹⁰³ *On Invention* 4.10; “Hermogenes” point is that a “trope” is a word “which can be applied in common to the subject and a subject brought in from elsewhere” (4.10.199; Kennedy 2005 179). Psellos’ highly compressed rendition of this idea makes it fairly obscure.

¹⁰⁴ *On Invention* 4.11.

¹⁰⁵ That is, call a *pornê* a *hetaira*.

¹⁰⁶ *On Invention* 4.12. *Kakozêlon*, more literally, means “bad imitation” or tasteless emulation of *genikôtatos logos*, “most proper speech” or speech most suitable to its kind (or genre).

¹⁰⁷ *On Invention* 4.13. “Figured problems” are cases for declamation exercises in which the ostensible subject of the speech is actually a cover for something else. In the “by implication” type (*kata emphasin*) the speaker hints at things that cannot be spoken openly (i.e., because they are too shameful or too politically dangerous); in the “by indirection” type (*kata plagion*) the speaker’s arguments lead to different conclusions than those they are ostensibly proving; and in the “by opposite” type (*kata enantion*) the speaker says the opposite of what he means. Kennedy 2005 189-193 translates these types as “by implication,” “deflected,” and “by the opposite”; Patillon 1997 313-318 renders them as “by allusion” (*par allusifis*), “by indirection” (*par indirects*), and “by the contrary” (*par le contraire*).

¹⁰⁸ *On Invention* 4.14. “Comparative problems” (i.e., for declamation exercises) involve the weighing of alternatives, usually at the stasis of conjecture or definition; “motive and capacity” are subheads of conjecture.

There also is a third study of the incandescent art,¹⁰⁹
which is called the *Types* [*ideai*] or indeed the forms of speaking,¹¹⁰
by which the speeches of orators are characterized.¹¹¹

Each type consists of eight components:

the first is the thought [*ennoia*]; next is the diction [*lexis*];

third is the figure of speech [*tês lexeôs to schema*];

and fourth is the method [*methodos*] of thought¹¹² —

after which there are the clauses [*kola*], and then the remaining three, 360

the cadence [*anapausis*], the composition [*sunthesis*], and finally the rhythm [*rhuthmos*].

Each type of style is divided into these components.

The first three principal types that are distinguished¹¹³
are called clarity [*saphênia*], grandeur [*megethos*], and beauty [*kallos*];

and the opposite of the clear is the obscure [*asaphes*],

grandeur has meanness [*eutelia*] as its opposite,

and the slovenly [*ameles*] is contrary to the beautified [*kekallopismenon*].

The next four types that are individually laid out are

rapidity [*gorgotês*], of which the opposite is the supine [*huptiotês*],

and character [*ethos*], sincerity [*alêtheia*], and forcefulness [*deinotês*]. 370

Clarity is divided into these two parts:

into purity [*katharotês*], as I say, and distinctness [*eukrinia*]:¹¹⁴

the opposite of the former is abundance [*peribolê*],

and of the latter, confusion [*sunchusis*], which is a fault.

Grandeur is divided into these six types:

solemnity [*semnotês*], asperity [*trachutês*], and brilliance [*lamprotês*] third,¹¹⁵

and florescence [*akmê*], vehemence [*sphodrotês*], and abundance [*peribolê*] sixth.¹¹⁶

There are four types in the division of character:

modesty [*epieikeia*], simplicity [*aphelleia*], sincerity [*alêtheia*], and indignation [*barutês*].¹¹⁷

Character is never viewed as just itself, 380

but is composed from simplicity and modesty,

while from modesty spring subtlety [*drimutês*] and sweetness [*glukutês*].¹¹⁸

The thought of purity [*katharotês*] is the common and customary;

the method is a straightforward setting forth of facts;

the diction is clear and not metaphorical [*tropikê*], and follows normal usage;

the figuration is arrangement in the most straightforward order;

the clauses are short and bring each thought to completion;

¹⁰⁹ *Hê puripnoou technê*, more literally the “fire-breathing” or “fiery” art.

¹¹⁰ *Morphai tou logou*.

¹¹¹ Psellos is now taking up Hermogenes’ *Peri Ideôn*, generally known as *On Types of Style* (tr. Wooten 1987). Hermogenes analyzes each “type” of style (or what Psellos calls a “form of speaking”) according to the eightfold scheme that Psellos mentions here. The basic scheme is laid out in *On Types* 1.1. It is noteworthy that Psellos sees the *Peri Ideôn* as a *technê* for the “study” (*mathêma*) and “characterization” (*charaktêrizontai*) — the critical description — of orators’ styles. See the closing paragraphs of Hermogenes, *Types* 2.12.412-413; and Wooten 1987 129-130.

¹¹² Rendered as “approach” by Wooten 1987 6; Hermogenes explains the “method” as the “figure of thought” (*schema tês ennoias*; *Types* 1.1.222) through which the “thought” is expressed — such as apostrophe, ratiocination, personification, rhetorical question, etc.

¹¹³ Psellos here introduces Hermogenes’ seven main types of style: clarity [*saphênia*] (*Types* 1.2-4); dignity of speech and grandeur [*axiômatou logou kai megethos*] (1.5-11); artfulness and beauty [*epimeleia kai kallos*] (1.12); rapidity [*gorgotês*] (2.1); character [*ethos*] (2.2-6); sincerity of speech [*alêthinos logou*] (2.7-8); and forcefulness [*deinotês*]. Clarity, grandeur, character, and sincerity (or truthfulness) have sub-types, while all of these types together, when combined with supreme skill, yield “forcefulness” (which might also be rendered as “stunning virtuosity” or, more literally, as “awesomeness”).

¹¹⁴ *Types* 1.3-4.

¹¹⁵ *Types* 1.6-7, 9; Psellos here begins to depart slightly from the order of Hermogenes’ chapters.

¹¹⁶ *Types* 1.10, 8, 11.

¹¹⁷ *Types* 2.6, 3, 7, 8. Psellos here differs from Hermogenes, who makes the subtypes of “character” simplicity (*aphelia*), sweetness (*glukutês*), subtlety (*drimutês*), and modesty (*epieikeia*), and makes indignation (*barutês*) a subtype of sincerity (*alêtheia*). See Wooten 1987 xii.

¹¹⁸ *Types* 2.2, 4-5. Psellos here seems to grasp one of the key insights of Hermogenes’ *On Types*: stylistic types are recognized as variably composed from overlapping (or blended) sets of features and subtypes.

the composition is unconcerned with hiatus;
and the cadence is an iambic sort of phrasing.¹¹⁹

The thoughts of distinctness [*eukrinia*] fall under two heads: 390
those that sum up, and refer the discourse back
to a starting point, and, conversely,
those that elegantly give shape to what will come.¹²⁰
The method is putting forth facts in natural order,
the opposed positions first and rebuttals second;
the figuration is that of groupings, partition [*merismos*] or arrangement [*taxis*];
and the diction, clauses, rhythm, cadence, and composition
are such as also belong to the sister-types of purity.

The thoughts of solemnity [*semnotês*] are concerned with gods and things divine;
the methods are commanding and confident declarations, 400
especially allegorical statements that ward off nearly everyone;
the diction is broad and beautiful, and fills the mouth;
the figuration is straightforward; the clauses are cut short;
the composition contains a mix of many phrasings,¹²¹
dactylic, spondaic, and anapestic;
and the cadence uses spondees and dactyls,
from which it arrives at a familiar and fitting rhythm.¹²²

The thought of asperity [*trachutês*] is the censure
of greater persons, unexpectedly;¹²³ 410
the method is not to soften the listener artfully,
but to be undisguised and uncomplicated;
the diction is harsh, and different from what preceded;¹²⁴
the figures are imperious and highly refutative [*elenktika*];
and the clauses are brief, and the composition is nonrhythmical.

The thought of vehemence [*sphodrotês*] is the refutation of lessers;¹²⁵
the method is unhesitating; the diction is very fresh;¹²⁶
the figuration is apostrophic; the clauses are generally trisyllabic;
the composition frequently clashes vowels together;
and the rest is the same as asperity, and differs in no way.

The thoughts of brilliance [*lamprotês*] are wholly brilliant in nature, 420
the kind that are confident and frank;¹²⁷
the diction is that of a swelling solemnity;
the figuration includes direct denial [*anaïresis*], asyndeton,
subordination [*plagiasmos*]¹²⁸ and separation [*apostasis*], which is more artistic;¹²⁹
and the cadence, rhythm, and composition are solemn.

The thoughts and methods of florescence [*akmê*] are like

¹¹⁹ *Types* 1.3.

¹²⁰ Hermogenes says, "It is the function of distinctness to determine what aspects of the case the judges should consider first and what they should consider second and to make that clear to them." *Types* 1.4.235; tr. Wooten 1987 14.

¹²¹ *Phônêenta*, usually "vowels," but here indicating "soundings" in the sense of musical phrases.

¹²² *Types* 1.6.

¹²³ *Types* 1.7. Hermogenes' point is that the censure should occur as an "unexpected" outburst or departure from the speaker's (ostensibly) planned remarks.

¹²⁴ That is, the speaker turns to a "sudden" outburst, with a change in diction and tone.

¹²⁵ *Types* 1.8.

¹²⁶ I.e., not constrained to "customary" usage; the "vehement" reply should not seem canned, and can dispense with niceties.

¹²⁷ "Confident and frank" expression is the method of brilliance, according to Hermogenes; *Types* 1.9.

¹²⁸ I.e., subordinate constructions, typically in an oblique case (i.e. genitive, dative, or accusative).

¹²⁹ *Apostasis*, as a rhetorical term, indicates "setting-off" in the sense of breaking off a sentence and starting an independent clause (where one might otherwise choose to subordinate it in a periodic construction).

those of asperity and vehemence;
 the figuration is that of brilliance; the clauses those of vehemence;
 and the cadence, the rhythm, and also the composition
 are those of brilliance too.¹³⁰ 430

Abundance [*peribolê*] has no characteristic diction, as he [Hermogenes] says,
 unless someone wants to argue for parallel constructions.¹³¹
 The figures are those that generate variations on a thought:
 subordination [*plagiasmos*], partition [*merismos*], putting the point,¹³²
 supposition [*to kath' hupothesin*], and run-on constructions [*epitrechon*].¹³³
 There are no other specific features of the abundant style.

Beauty [*kallos*] has no characteristic thought or method,¹³⁴
 but its figures are many and varied:
 all parallelism [*parisôsis*] of beginnings and endings,¹³⁵
 repetition [*epanodos*] in clauses (but not in phrases),¹³⁶ 440
 counterturn [*antistrophe*],¹³⁷ climax [*klimax*], inversion [*hyperbaton*],
 novel expression [*kainoprepê*], modification [*poluptoton*],¹³⁸ and attractive negations.¹³⁹
 The clauses are somewhat long; the composition is non-clashing [*asunkroustos*].¹⁴⁰

No-one has discovered the thought of rapidity [*gorgotês*],¹⁴¹
 and its proper method is unlike the others.¹⁴²
 it uses a quick succession of replies [*apantêsis*].
 The figures of rapidity are the “run-on” construction [*epitrechon*],
 lack of connectives [*asundetôn*], quick variation [*exallagê*],
 linked repetition [*epanastrophê*], interruption [*epistrophê*], and interweaving [*sumplokê*];¹⁴³
 the composition should avoid hiatus; 450
 the cadence is trochaic and never stately.

The thoughts of simplicity [*apheleias*] are completely accessible,
 wholly unaffected, even childlike;¹⁴⁴
 the method is redundancy [*pleonazousai*], especially with division into parts [*to kata meros*];¹⁴⁵
 the diction includes idiomatic expressions [*idiotopoi*], such as “to brother”;¹⁴⁶

¹³⁰ *Types* 1.10.

¹³¹ *Types* 1.11.284-285, speaking of “parallel constructions that say the same thing in different ways”; tr. Wooten 1987 46.

¹³² *To kata tèn krisin*, “what is under judgment” (?); this does not appear in Hermogenes, and seems to be a muddle for what Hermogenes calls *to kata arsin kai thesin* (1.11.293), which Wooten 1987 52 translates as “negation and affirmation,” but which in *metrical* terminology means “upbeat and downbeat” (the raising and lowering of the foot in keeping time), or the short and long syllables composing a metrical foot. Hermogenes may be adapting the notions of *arsis* and *thesis* metaphorically to indicate “upbeat” and “downbeat” iterations of the same idea, which he illustrates with this example from Demosthenes (*On the False Embassy* 12): “not as one who would sell your interests [etc.] ... but as one who would keep watch on the others.”

¹³³ “Run-on” (or perhaps “add-on”) constructions involve the addition of phrases and clauses that expand a sentence with circumstantial details. Hermogenes’ example is “Since there was no longer any meeting of the Assembly because of their being used up already ...” and the rest of the long sentence that follows (in Demosthenes, *False Embassy* 154; *Types* 1.11.290).

¹³⁴ *Types* 1.12.

¹³⁵ *Tôn anô kai tôn katô*, literally [parallelisms] “from above and from below.” This phrase, which does not appear in Hermogenes, appears to be shorthand for Hermogenes’ discussion of the various kinds of *parisôsis*.

¹³⁶ Psellos substitutes *epanodos*, “recapitulation” (e.g. repetition of words or phrases in succeeding clauses) for what Hermogenes calls *epanaphora* (the repetition of a phrase at the beginning of each clause in a series; 1.12.302).

¹³⁷ This is Psellos’ rendition of what Hermogenes calls *epanastrophê*, beginning a clause with the same words that ended the previous clause (1.12.302). Modern handbooks treat *antistrophe* as a sequence of clauses ending with the same words.

¹³⁸ *Poluptôton*, the repetition of a word in varied forms.

¹³⁹ *Eueideis anaireseis*; cf. *eueidês*, “comely, beautiful.” This is probably what Hermogenes calls affirmation by double negatives (1.12.306).

¹⁴⁰ That is, the composition avoids hiatus, or “clashing vowels” (*sunkroustos tôn phônêentôn*; *Types* 1.12.308).

¹⁴¹ *Types* 2.1.

¹⁴² Hermogenes says rapidity has only one method, which resembles “cleverness and subtlety” (*oxutês kai drimutês*) but is not the same (2.1.313).

¹⁴³ For *epanastrophê*, see above; *epistrophê* (turnabout, turning-to, correction) may be Psellos’ rendition of what Hermogenes calls *hupostraphê*, “parenthesis” (*Types* 2.1.314)

¹⁴⁴ *Types* 2.3; Psellos has skipped over character (*êthos*; 2.2), taking up its subtypes.

¹⁴⁵ That is, accumulation of superfluous or redundant details (pleonasm), by substituting for a general concept its component parts: e.g., instead of “harvesters and others who work for hire,” “harvesters and diggers and binders and shepherds and herdsmen” (*Types* 2.3.326; tr. Wooten 1987 73).

the clauses are those of purity; the composition is relaxed;
the cadence is steady; and the rhythm likewise.

The thoughts of sweetness [*glukutês*] are mainly the mythical,¹⁴⁷
or those that give rise to narratives resembling myths,
things that please the senses, and the assignment of rational intent 460
to things that lack it, for that is altogether sweet.¹⁴⁸
The method is that of purity; the diction that of simplicity;
the figuration that of purity, and likewise beauty;
the composition avoids hiatus, and is almost metrical;
the cadence is that of solemnity; and the rhythm is that of simplicity.

The thoughts of subtlety [*drimutês*] are superficially profound:¹⁴⁹
the method is not to bring flashy cleverness into your discourse,
but to write complex and wondrous things in the simplest way.
There is a second kind of subtlety, in diction,
which is proper usage [*kuria*] that is properly not proper: 470
for properly dogs are “philanthropists,”
for they love [*philousi*] humanity [*tôn anthrôpôn*], but also not properly,
since philanthropy has another meaning;
so what is conveyed through the same diction
is subtle in a certain way — if indeed the Technographer [Hermogenes] thinks it so.¹⁵⁰
Another type of subtlety is the pun [*paronomasia*];¹⁵¹
and another is sequenced substitution [*to kat’ akolouthian*],
which leads from a hard trope to a harder.¹⁵²

The thought of modesty [*epieikeia*] is willingly to claim less than one could,¹⁵³
and to be charitable to an opponent and grant him some point, 480
and to say that you have entered the lawcourt by necessity;
the method is to play down one’s rights,
and not to make vehement declarations against one’s opponents in court;
the diction and the rest are like simplicity.

The thoughts of sincerity [*to alêthês*] and spontaneity [*to endiatheton*]¹⁵⁴
are those of simplicity, modesty, and complaining in some way.
Complaint is the method for such thought —
when the purpose of what is said is not complaining —
with the use of emotional outbursts, oaths, fear and distress,
wishing, anger and astonishment which have not been prepared for, 490
and counter-proposition [*antithesis*] not connected to the rebuttal,
and the assertion of thoughts without preparation [*katastasis*]
and without coherent sequence in the progression of ideas.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁶ *Adelphizeîn*, “to call brother” (lit. “to brother”); Isocrates, *Aegineticus* 30.

¹⁴⁷ *Types* 2.4.

¹⁴⁸ I.e., to assign *proairêsis* to things that are *aproairêton*, as when (as Hermogenes points out, 2.4.333) Socrates in the *Phaedrus* says the trees outside the city have no wish to teach him anything. The remark that “this is altogether sweet” (*gluku gar touto pantôs*) is Psellos’ addition.

¹⁴⁹ *Epipolês batheiai*: a direct quote from Hermogenes; *Types* 2.5.339.

¹⁵⁰ This example, which derives from Hermogenes (2.5.340-341), is hard to square with the notion, above, of subtlety as *not* clever contrivance but “deep” things said in a simple way; Psellos, for his part, appears to have some difficulty with it. Hermogenes seems to have had in mind the double entendre, or the superficially simple but polyvalent locution.

¹⁵¹ Specifically, *paronomasia* is the type of pun in which a word is used (repeated) in both its “proper” sense and a figurative sense (or, simply, in different senses).

¹⁵² *Akolouthia*, lit. “following, sequence, analogy,” rhetorically is substitution between words that can be thought to imply each other (e.g., “fire” and “light”). Hermogenes’ idea is that *akolouthia* progresses from a less strange or difficult metaphor to a “harder” one, thus making it seem less strange (than if it had been directly introduced without preparation); *Types* 2.5.343-344.

¹⁵³ *Types* 2.6.

¹⁵⁴ *Types* 2.7.

The diction is that of piteously-spoken asperity, purity, simplicity, and especially sweetness; and the figuration is that of the vehement and repetitive type of style: apostrophe [*apostrophê*], deictics [*to deiktikon*], artful perplexity [*diaporein entechnôs*], doubtfulness [*endoiasmos*], judgments [*epikrisis*], and self-correction [*epidiorthôsis*]. The clauses, cadence, rhythm, and composition are all those of vehemence and simplicity. 500

The thoughts of indignation [*barutês*]¹⁵⁶ — should someone be vexed — are adding up good deeds and encountering punishment instead, and reproaching those who have shown poor sense, especially through comparisons with better things that have been done. The method is irony against the weaknesses of the opponent.

There is no other special feature [*idion*] of indignation besides these two.

The thoughts of forcefulness [*deinotês*] are paradoxes and profundities;¹⁵⁷ the diction is dignified, and highly figured; the figuration, clauses, rhythm, cadence, and composition are (among the types enumerated)¹⁵⁸ those of solemnity, florescence, brilliance, and abundance. 510

Let civic discourse be adorned in every way,¹⁵⁹ and let it have these types [*ideas*] of style in particular: character, sincerity, abundance,¹⁶⁰ rapidity, clarity, asperity, florescence, solemnity, brilliance, and forcefulness of method,¹⁶¹ which I will overview for you, as in one heading.¹⁶²

Unfamiliar diction [*lexis*] provides three ways [*methodoi*] of inventing obscure ideas, [which are] foreign words, technical terms, or legal terms;¹⁶³ mistakes in diction are corruptions [*phthora*] and improper usages [*akuria*];¹⁶⁴ we should use the same word whenever there is one word that suits the facts;¹⁶⁵ there is an abundance [*perittotês*] of both diction and thought, 520

On the Method of Forcefulness

¹⁵⁵ The general point here is that the complaint should seem to emerge spontaneously, not by premeditated design, in a speech ostensibly devoted to other purposes — and that it should express itself in what seems to be an unplanned, “disordered” way.

¹⁵⁶ *Types* 2.8.

¹⁵⁷ *Types* 2.9. The rhetorical term *deinotês* is not easily translated: deriving from *deinos*, “terrifying, awesome,” it takes on the meaning of a supreme, stunning skillfulness or virtuosity, and is commonly translated as “forcefulness” or “force”; a better translation may be “awesomeness.” It seems to differ from the “grand” style as discussed by, e.g., Cicero or Quintilian, but to resemble the “sublime” (*hypsos*) style as discussed by “Longinus”; see also the discussion of *deinotês* in “Demetrius” *On Style (Peri Hermêneias)* 240-304. On *Deinotês*, see additional notes below.

¹⁵⁸ *Tôn apêrithmêmenôn*, lit. “of those enumerated”; this may be a (vague) echo of Hermogenes’ statement, at the beginning of the chapter, that *deinotês* is “the proper use of all the types previously mentioned” (*tôn proeirêmenon*) in varying combinations, according to what is opportune and fitting at any given moment in a discourse (2.9.368-369).

¹⁵⁹ *Types* 2.10, on the use of the types of style in *politikos logos*, “civic (political, public) discourse.” Psellos omits the last two chapters (2.11-12), on “pure practical” (*haplôs politicos*) and “pure panegyric” (*haplôs panêgurikos*) discourse.

¹⁶⁰ Psellos here employs *peribeblēmenon*, “amplified, expanded, cast-around, circumlocutory,” as an apparent synonym for Hermogenes’ term, *peribolê*.

¹⁶¹ *Deinotêta methodou*: this seems different from the title of the final book in the Hermogenic corpus, *On the Method of Forcefulness (Peri Methodou Deinotêtos)*, and suggests an interpretation of it as a treatise on “forceful method” rather than the “forceful style” in general, though l. 540 refers to *methodoi deinotêtos ideas*, “methods of the forceful type [of style]; see below.

¹⁶² Psellos here transitions to the final treatise in the Hermogenic corpus, *On the Method of Forcefulness [Deinotês]*. On *deinotês*, see above. On this Hermogenic treatise — which bears little resemblance to the treatment of *deinotês* outlined by Hermogenes in *On Types of Style* — see Kennedy 2005 201-203. It may not have been written originally as a treatise on *deinotês*, and looks like something of a miscellany on figures of discourse (perhaps, however, suggesting “method”). Psellos touches on only some of this book’s 38 chapters, mostly those from its first half, and very cursorily at that.

¹⁶³ *Method* 2.

¹⁶⁴ *Method* 3.

¹⁶⁵ *Method* 4.

of diction by dwelling on something [*diatribê*], and of thought by arguments [*enthumêseis*];¹⁶⁶
 for presumptuous and rash thoughts in a speech
 there are two remedies and excuses,
 acknowledgment of rashness and a brief insertion;¹⁶⁷
 you should artistically pass over something [*paraleipsis*] in a speech
 to increase suspicion about what clearly has been left unsaid;¹⁶⁸ 530
 a timely [*en kairôi*] circumlocution [*to periplekein*] is not without art;¹⁶⁹
 understand that repetition [*epanalepsis*] occurs for the sake of
 teaching something, or firmness of manner;¹⁷⁰
 the figure of interrogation [*peusis*] cannot be denied;¹⁷¹
 equivalencies [*ta isa*], inversions [*huperbata*], feigned improvisation [*prospoiêsis schediou*],
 amplification then proof [*auxêsis eit' apodeixis*], speaking opposites [*to legein enantia*],
 praising oneself [*to enkômion heauton*] when it is acceptable in the speech,
 the use of verses by quotation [*kollêsis*] and adaptation [*parôidia*],
 and artfully speaking the tragic style [*to tragikôs*] in prose —
 all these are methods of the forceful type of style [*deinotês idea*].¹⁷² 540
 Well then, may this synopsis of the art be an art in miniature for you:¹⁷³
 a lesson easily taken in, concise and brief,
 full of sweetness, full of charm,
 sweet-speaking, sweet-voiced, and unusually sweet-singing,
 so that even when speaking playfully¹⁷⁴ you shall profit from the discourse.

¹⁶⁶ *Method* 5; “Hermogenes” mentions two methods each for abundance of diction and thought: for diction, “dwelling” and “fullness” (*plêthos*); and for thought, “supplemental argumentations” (*epenthumêseis*) and the insertion of “general statements” (*katholikoi logoi*).

¹⁶⁷ I.e., insertion of a qualification or an “as it were”; *Method* 6.

¹⁶⁸ *Method* 7; i.e., mentioning something by saying that you won’t discuss it, or conspicuously leaving it out.

¹⁶⁹ *Method* 8.

¹⁷⁰ *Method* 9. “Hermogenes” mentions three functions for *epanalêpsis* (repetition, resumption): “teaching (or explaining) something” (*didaskalia pragmatos*); “recommendation or attack on a person” (*prosôpou sustasis ê diabolê*); and “firmness of character” (*êthous bebaiôsis*), which Kennedy 2005 219 renders as “strengthening characterization.” Psellos reduces these to two, in essence by collapsing the second and third into one, which he calls *to bebaion tropou*, “firmness of manner,” which arguably is a defensible simplification based on “Hermogenes” examples.

¹⁷¹ *Method* 10. *Peusis*, “interrogation,” is in essence the “rhetorical question.”

¹⁷² A very rapid gallop across *Method* 13 (on *isa schemata*, equal figures), 14 (*huperbaton*, inversion), 17 (*prospoiêsis*, feigning spontaneity), 18 (*auxêsis* and *apodeixis*, amplification and proof in judicial speeches), 22 (*enantia legonta*, saying the opposite of what one means), 25 (*to epainein heauton*, praising oneself without giving offense), 30 (*chrêsis epôn en pezôi logoi*, the use of verses in prose), and 33 (*to tragikôs legein*, speaking tragically).

¹⁷³ *Soi technidrion*, more literally “a mini-art for you.”

¹⁷⁴ *Paizôn logikôs*, more literally “playing discursively (or argumentatively)”; Psellos may mean composition and declamation exercises.

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